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No-Fault: A Perspective
Leon Green*
At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
December 27, 1974, the Torts Section sponsored a panel discussion of
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell's proposal that no-fault insurance be expanded beyond the field of automobile accidents. The proposal, as presented in O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance:
Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973), advocates "enterprise liability" for any entity or person that systematically creates risks of personal
injury. It would be "no-fault" liability, blind to the fault of either party,
and paid by the enterprise's insurer or by the enterprise as a self-insurer.
Payments would be limited to out-of-pocket losses not compensated from
collateral sources, and no recovery would be allowed for pain and suffering. The plaintiff would have the option of asserting his claim either
under regular tort liability or under enterprise liability, unless the defendant elects in advance to be covered exclusively by enterprise liability.
Enterprise liability would not apply to injuries intentionally caused by
the enterprise or intentionally inflicted by the victim upon himself.
The following is Professor Green's response to the O'Connell proposal.
These remarks were delivered in acknowledgement of the William Lloyd
Prosser Award "for outstanding contribution to the development of the
law of torts" presented to Professor Green at the meeting. Editors.

In discussions with philosophers, economists, and other abstract artists,
I am always ill at ease if not terrified. Their broad assumptions and
sweeping conclusions leave a mere lawyer, with his meager history and
earthy arguments, little chance of survival. Please do not misunderstand
me. I am aware that philosophies, economic theories, and scientific projections had their beginnings in hunches, bubble blowing, daydreams,
and inspirations at first simple and definite, but I am also aware that they
later became expanded to abstractions incomprehensible other than by
the elite. I do not question the validity of any of them. Instead, I recognize in them the unlimited creative power of human beings. Nor does it
bother me that most of their creations have flourished for a season and
then collapsed or have had to wait until a later day for their acceptance.
For example, it does not destroy my faith in economists that today they
are bewildered by the coexistence of inflation and depression. I am sure
that after we have weathered this illegitimate crisis they will regroup-and
explain to those who come after us how such phenomena could appear
simultaneously and how successfully they were dealt with on sound
economic principles.
When I first read Professor O'Connell's article, "Expanding No-Fault
*Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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Beyond Auto Insurance,"l I marked it as a worthy inspiration of an able
daydreamer. Successive readings have deeply engraved that impression.
Under the seductive title "No-Fault," he has created a structure for the
care of those who fall victim to the hazards of enterprise that would leave
it free to give us more and better goods and services without subjection
to the delays, expense, and encumbrances of courts and lawyers. It could
prove as exciting as the bubble-blown creation that made it possible a few
days ago to look in on Jupiter with a promised visit to one of Saturn's
moons some 5 years hence. Or it could prove as practical as the inspiration that gave us the blessings of Geritol. But whatever it may do will be
of great concern to those who spend their days with torts.
If our people continue to maintain a free society, my perspective is that
No-Fault will be woven into the texture of tort law in a manner that will
not conflict with our goals of peace, happiness, health, justice, economic
welfare, law and order here on earth and in heaven hereafter. But it is
entirely possible that No-Fault will have considerable influence on our
more practiced and negative virtues of war, power, greed, deceit, waste,
riotous living, sex, hate, and death. This does not mean there will be
breeds of full-fledgedsaints and dedicated sinners at one another's throats,
but that everyone will take turns as saint and sinner at many points in
time. Creation and destruction will continue to go hand in hand as they
have done fi-om the beginning, and thus the schizophrenic balance of love
and fury will be maintained. It is in this murky atmosphere that tort law
best serves to penalize and ameliorate the faults of people, and, if NoFault can lessen tort law's labors and increase the bounties, No-Fault will
find a home in torts. In support of this distant perspective, I offer my
further remarks.

A Little History
For more than four centuries tort law was developed on the premise
that one must so conduct himself as not to injure another, but if he did
injure another he must compensate him.2 When industrial enterprise
became a dominant social factor in the early 1800s, that premise was
modified to enable enterprise to base its liability on a duty of care commensurate with the risk of injury. By the use of this social "gyroscope"
the courts have developed modern tort actions appropriate to the risks of
physical injury to which anyone at any moment may become a victim '59 VA. L. REV.749 (1973); see also O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds
of Accidents: A Proposal and an "Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN.L. REV.145 (1974).
2Green & Smith, h'egligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-I, 50 TEXAS
L. REV. 1093,
1096 (1972) [hereinafter cited as No-Fault and Jury Trial -IJ ; Green, The Thrust of Tort
Law, Part I: The Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1961), in L. GREEN,THE
LITIGATION
PROCESS
IN TORTLAW59 (1965); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its
History (pts. 1-3), 7 HARV.
L. REV.315,383,441 (1894).
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actions of trespass, nuisance, negligence, defective products, and ultrahazardous enterprise. The big change in tort law came in the development of the negligence action based on the fault of the victim, with many
defenses directed at the victim's conduct, and with all of the burdens
shifted to him instead of remaining on the defendant as under the early
common law actions which were based on the fault of the defendant.3
The faults of victims and the defenses against liability were exploited
throughout the 1800s with practical immunity of enterprise for personal
injuries4 until the casualties inflicted upon railroad and other industrial
employees, passengers, and highway travelers received legislative attention. Legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes, limited No-Fault
workmen's compensation and employer liability systems which, after
considerable opposition, gained the approval of the appellate courts! As
a r e s u l ~in negligence actions for personal injury and death, whether
based on common law or statute, the color of fault as a basis of liability or
defense has over the years faded considerably into the duty of care commensurate with the risk of i n j ~ r y . ~
Beginning late in the 1800s and accelerating throughout the 1900s,
one of the chief functions of state and federal courts in personal injury
litigation has been the rejection or modification of the common law defenses developed during the 1
These defenses could not withstand
the changes in the social and economic environments largely created by
enterprise itself. Its immunities were well entrenched and desperately
defended, and there are still strongholds to be reduced and much doctrinal debris to be removed. Legislatures have given aid by many specific
statutes and especially by consenting to the rulemaking power of the
courts under which many procedures have enabled the lawyers of the
victims of enterprise to become an effective and respected professional
group.
But it must be added that the development of law schools; the publication of law reviews and professional journals generally; a multitude of
able young lawyers who have become practitioners, judges, teachers, and
law clerks; numerous continuing legal education institutes; and socially
motivated bar and other associations, have created a great profession essential to the operations of enterprise of every character and to the enlightenment of the courts in the protection of its victims.
3No-Fault and Jury Trial- I 1096-98; L. GREEN,TRAFFIC
VICTIMS:TORT
LAWAND IN11-12 (1958).
4No-Fault and Jury Trial - I 1098-99.
5Id. at 1099; Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 TEXAS
L. REV.461 (1948); Malone, American
Fatal Accidents Statutes -Part I: The Legislative Birth Pains, 1965 DUKEL.J. 673; Malone,
The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN.L. REV.1043 (1965).
" 0 - h u l t and Jury Trial - I 1099-1100.

SURANCE

7Green & Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial - 11, 50 TEXAS
L. REV.1297,
1298 (1972).
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T h e Courthouse and the Courts
The county courthouse has been the citizen's school of democratic
government from the beginning - a symbol of justice both trusted and
feared. It is the lawyer's forum, and even those who never enter there do
their work in its shadow. Here people stand more equal and those who
have sinned and those sinned against may fight out their differences under law, and, win or lose, live to sin and fight again another day. In the
meanwhile, the courts have become the basic Anglo-American institution for protecting against many types of injuries including the failure of
enterprise to exercise care for its victims commensurate with the dangers
of its activities. Any person, however insignificant, may bring any other
person, however powerful into court to give account for serious injury
that has been suffered at his hands. This is the most valuable right any
person has for the protection of all his other rights, and this protection is
enjoyed by enterprise and also by its victims. The tort action is the
ombudsman for both.
The courts are administered through judges, jurors, witnesses, and
lawyers. They teach multitudes the disciplines of government they can
learn nowhere else. They perform their services in the open for all to
see, and their weakness is at times glaring and disturbing. But the courtrooms have been kept open-to people who have suffered injury at the
hands of others, and it is the lawyer's obligation to see that they are never
closed. The courthouse lawyers of both enterprise and its victims are entrusted with great power and corresponding obligations. As officers of
the courts they are essential to the administration of the law and to the
protection of the rights of their clients under the law. They perform
their functions always under the eyes of each other, the judges, the jurors,
their clients, citizens at large, and are subject to discipline by their profession under the supervision of the courts. No other professional group
could survive such surveillance. They are under the severest discipline
of any officials who render the services of government or of other institutions. And it is the Warrens, the Jaworskis and the Siricas who cleanse
our temples and restore the faith of citizens in their law.
The gloomy arguments made by the advocates of No-Fault based on
the delays, expense, and uncertainties of litigation; the inability to make
proof against manufacturers, con tractors, doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies; and the high fees exacted by lawyers for the cumbersome processes and inadequate judgments gained for their clients are
supposed to be arguments that require the removal of the protection
given by the courts. They are equally arguments that heap shame upon
enterprise for the callous neglect of its victims and make imperative the
more adequate administration of the courts. The courts can yield to no
substitute at the ground level of citizenship for sustaining a stable and
effective government. And it may be said in their behalf that they would
have made the adjustments between enterprise and its victims more
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rational long ago if enterprise had not interposed its stubborn and selfish
resistance. There are other and better ways for eliminating the weaknesses of the courts than by reducing their responsibility and the protection they give.
If we as teachers of law acknowledge our own responsibility, the courts
have a commitment of our fidelity. We teach their judges and those who
appear before them in behalf of clients. We interpret their judgments
and write the books they use, and are free to tell them when they err and
to applaud when they score. We could not ask for more honorable service
or have a more exacting obligation than to devote our energies to their
successful administration. When they fail we also fail.

T h e Problem
The tort problems that come before the courts are not trifling. A
serious personal injury is frequently the most severe tragedy a member of
a family and the family itself can suffer. By statute the death action is a
family action. The serious personal injury is even more a family action
and has been so recognized by many judges and juries. The children and
the disabled members of the family would not be in the courtroom during a personal injury trial were it not to demonstrate the obligations of
the victim. They are not recorded as witnesses, and appellate courts, not
knowing the weight they register with judge and jury, not infrequently
reduce a victim's judgment. It is not too late to permit the full disclosure
of the tragedies on which the courts pass judgment.
Nor is it too late to ask enterprise to modify its attitude toward its victims. With few exceptions, it has never recognized the full partnership it
has with its employees, nor has it accepted its responsibility to its victims
although it knows victims are inevitable in its operations. For a full century enterprise was given almost complete immunity from liability to its
victim^.^ It had to be forced to protect its employees from the dangers of
the crude machines and tools of infant industry - forced even to provide
a safe place for employees to work. When enterprise became able to pay
its way, it had been spoiled by irresponsibility and had to be forced to contribute to the welfare of its injured workers by an insurance device which
was seldom adjusted to the economic environment in which the employees lived.9 The early shortsightedness of enterprise continues to
bring periodic power struggles with its employees that hurt numberless
innocent people.
Enterprise is retarded in its social outlook. It goes to great expense to
defeat the claims of consumers of its defectively dangerous products.lO I t
still resents the use made of the courts by its victims and the contingent
8No-Fault and Jury Trial - I 1097-99.
s R ~ OF
~ THE
O NATIONAL
~ ~
COMMISSION
ON STATE
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
LAWS(1972).
lOMarschal1, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right: Manufacturers' Liability for
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fees it pays their lawyers if successful in litigating their claims, though in
the price its consumers pay for their goods and services they also pay for
the defenses and the judgments against enterprise and the fees of its
lawyers.
Doctors are not different. They may even refuse to give evidence as
experts in cases in which other doctors are sought to be held for malpractice." There is no other instance of pure greed so heartless as the appropriation by the doctors and drug suppliers of the benefits of medicare
and medicaid to the point of threatening their solvency.1z Nor are the
claim agents of insurance and other industries always found trustworthy.
They have been known to bring pressures to delay and reduce settlements, harass victims, and to employ deceits to deprive them of just settlements. Even the self-insured industries that anticipate the necessity of
paying claims by budgeting them as a cost of doing business are inclined
to resist their payment with all the savagery of the insurance companies.
T h e victim's lawyer, who usually comes late into a case, is at great disadvantage when the claim agents of enterprise have investigated, made
lists, and obtained statements of witnesses instantly or within hours after
the victim has been injured. If the claim is successfully or unsuccessfully
litigated, the lawyer is frequently called a shyster or ambulance chaser
though the investigation is made by a professional investigator. Even if
we assume that many of the complaints made against the courts, lawyers,
and tort action are true, most of them can be laid at the door of enterprise.
Its attitude has been progressively self-defeating. The courts have found
it necessary again and again to develop rules and procedures that enable
victims to litigate their claims on a more equal basis.l3 Advocates who
seek to have enterprise freed by No-Fault from the only power its victims
have to protect themselves would in large part shift the responsibilities to
the insurance industry that makes its profits from high premiums and
low settlements of strictly worded policies that leave a policyholder defenseless against its contentions. And if the policy is not sufficient to
meet the victim's losses, he is left to the resources provided for other emergencies.
No-Fault Insurance
T h e freedom from litigation sought for enterprise sails under a banner
that may imply something for nothing. Its wide legislative acceptance for
Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.1065 (1973).
"Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., dissenting); Kelner, T h e
Silent Doctors - The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U . RICH.L. REV.119 (1970).
12Chase, Doctor's Bonanza: Znj7ational.y EfSects of Medicare and Medicaid, 156 NEW
REPUBLIC
15 (Apr. 15, 1967); DeWolf, Medicare: T h e Easy Swindle, 215 NATIOS429 (1952).
l3See, e.g., FED. R. CIV.P. 7 (simplified pleadings), 15 (amended pleadings to conform to the
evidence), 26-35 (extensive discovery), 54 (grant appropriate relief regardless of pleadings).
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traffic injuries is limited to small claims.'* Such an arrangement would
seem to be highly desirable over the whole area of small claims. A wholesale method of dealing with mass problems that can be reduced to a statistical basis without injustice to the extremes is sensible. The big problem here is how much is small and how much is serious. The answer has
apparently been found in a rather wide segment of claims left to the option of the victims. The heavy advocacy on so many fronts merely to gain
the acceptance of No-Fault for small claims would be worthwhile but
would seem to be an oversell unless something more is in view. The
possibility that the small claims approach is the beginning of a campaign
to bring serious injuries under No-Fault is enough to require that all NoFault settlements be made of record open to public verification.
For serious injuries enterprise should never be permitted to be relieved
of its obligation to care for its victims, even by shifting the responsibility
to insurance. If deterrence has any social value, it must be sharply focused on this obligation case by case. If the economic burden borne by
enterprise or its consumers is an important factor in caring for the injured and their families, the fact should be kept out in the open. Neither
enterprise nor its consumers would have just cause for complaint. T h e
care of victims is as much the cost of doing business as are the raw materials required for products and services. The pinch that would count
can only be found in the day-to-day transactions, not in the broad concepts of the economic theorists.
I would not argue that a legislature may not strip citizens of their
rights. I simply move to the higher ground that no other victim is required to surrender a comparable right and that such a deprivation
would do great injustice and would take from the courts a power essential
to a free society and leave those who should share the responsibility beyond the reach of both the victim and the courts. T h e tort way of justice
is the examination of every case of serious injuries on its merits. T h e
variations in serious injuries to victims under widely different circumstances are too diverse in the injuries and the victim's needs to submit to
a statistical basis when we have well-established institutions for dealing
with victims and those by whose operations they are injured on the basis
of their conduct, responsibilities, burdens, and resources. It will be far
easier and less expensive to prepare judges and lawyers to function responsibly to the ends desired than to develop other institutions to serve
those ends.
It may be that beneath the hopes of those who place their faith in NoFault insurance is a belief that the courts are not employing reliable, just,
and consistent methods in evaluating the injuries suffered by the victims.
Such belief would have a substantial basis for legitimate criticism of tort
l4Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 383,
385-90.
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law and the courts, and would warrant great efforts to influence the
courts and the legal profession to readjust their procedures to meet the
criticisms lodged against them. It is on that hypothesis that I suggest that
enterprise is able to pay its way, and should be required to provide care
for its victims, and that the courts have the power and the responsibility
to provide procedures for the judges themselves to evaluate the injuries
inflicted by enterprise as determined by jury trial with full justice both
to the victim and enterprise.l5 And as an incident of the exercise of this
function of evaluation, the judges must also monitor the fees to which
the lawyers of the victims are entitled.l6

Assessment of Damages
The assessment of damages in serious personal injury and death cases
is frequently the most difficult issue in a tort action.'? In most cases it is
beyond the competence of a jury of laymen. Although the courts have
the power to control the issue, together with the rule-making power to
initiate procedures, they have done little to meet the 20thcentury magnitude of the assessment problem. For the most part they still rely on a
poorly designed veto power if a verdict seems to be too big or too 1ittle.ls
T h e assessment of damages on the basis of compensation for the injuries suffered is rarely possible in serious personal injury cases and also in
death cases. The basic considerations in behalf of a seriously injured
victim should be his rehabilitation or his care in light of his physical injuries and his economic obligations. The economic considerations of the
defendant enterprise in many cases will be of equal importance. The
verdicts of juries are little more than wild guesses. Only the judges are
capable of making the studies and gaining the experience necessary to
determine awards to meet the ends of justice to victims and to enterprise.lg
Trial by judge and jury, or by trial judge alone, should determine the
issues of liability, the items of injury, and the comparative fault percentages of the conduct of the litigants. Then the trial judge alone should
continue the trial in the exploratory process for assessment of the damages based on the liability findings. The items of physical injury and
expenses, together with the needs of the future, will frequently require
the use of experts. T h e economic considerations are not those of ecol5Green k Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and J u l y Trial (pts. 1-4), 50 TEXAS
L. REV.
1093,1297 (1972), 51 TEXAS
L. REV.207,825 (1973).
16Green 8r Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-IV, 51 TEXASL. REV.
825, 841-42 (1973).
''Id. at 828-29; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injuiy: T h e Impact of Insurance, 18 LAWk
Corur~aip.PROB.219,221-22 (1953).
'SGreen & Smith, hregligence Law, hTo-Fault,and Jury Trial - IV, 51 TEXAS
L. REV. 825,
829 (1973).
l9Id. at 842-45.
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nomic theory of commerce and trade, but the specific economic problems
of the litigants - applied economics based on ascertainable factual data.
The judges have no other function of greater importance. The insurance
companies cannot provide adequate and consistent protection at reasonable costs until the courts provide a reliable basis for evaluating the losses.
As difficult as the problem may seem, it will yield to study and experien~e.~O

20A more comprehensive discussion of this proposal is presented in Green 8: Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial - ZV, 51 TEXAS
L. k v . 825 (1973).

